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Abstract
Abstract
Most U.S. presidents will pursue third-party conflict mediation sometime during their administration.
However, the approach and level of commitment to those endeavors vary greatly across time and results are
often minimally successful. This study explains this variation in terms of domestic political considerations,
suggesting that the potential risks and payoffs in the domestic sphere primarily drive the supply of mediation,
rather than conflict characteristics, “ripeness” for resolution, or the national interest. Presidents are shown to
engage in mediation when they are relatively secure domestically, enjoying legislative success in Congress. The
results are consistent with the notion that presidents prefer political cover when engaging in foreign policy.
Thus, the argument informs the literature on mediator behavior by linking it with theories of foreign policy
decision making and suggests that the political context in which mediation is offered will influence its
prospects for success, often explaining why mediation efforts fall short. Moreover, given the trend toward
divided government in the United States, the results presented here suggest that mediation will become less
prevalent in U.S. foreign policy.
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Mediation is a popular conflict management strategy that is thought to be appealing to 
disputing parties because it is flexible and non-binding in nature. Similarly, because of its 
powerful position in the international system, the United States of America is a popular mediator 
because of its broad political influence and considerable political, economic, and military 
resources to commit to any conflict resolution endeavor. However, despite its appeal and 
prevalence as a conflict management strategy, empirically, mediation efforts are often 
unsuccessful, even when success is measured by small incremental steps. Moreover, powerful 
states like the U.S., which can exercise more influence and introduce incentives to the belligerent 
parties, are no more successful in mediating conflicts than weaker states. This study seeks to 
contribute to the understanding of third-party mediation dynamics by examining the U.S. case 
and focusing on how domestic political vulnerability influences the decision to engage in 
mediation. To do so, the literature on third-party mediation is tied with the literature on foreign 
policy decision-making. Moreover, focus is given specifically to arguments suggesting that 
leaders make such decisions primarily with their domestic political impact in mind. Examining 
two sources of domestic vulnerability, (a) the executive’s level of legislative support and (b) the 
proximity of elections, and considering theories of foreign policy decision-making, the empirical 
results suggest that U.S. presidents are more likely to engage in mediation at times when they 
enjoy broad political support in Congress.  The influence of election cycles on mediation 
behavior yield no statistically significant relationship. Such findings suggest that presidents are 
constrained by their domestic political circumstances, and that the decision to focus on 
diplomacy is driven and constrained by the domestic political costs likely to be incurred, but also 
that presidents are not seeking to use mediation as a tool to rally the public for re-election.  
Recent scholarship on conflict resolution processes has recognized the need for a greater 
understanding of the motivations of third-party mediators, especially state actors as mediators, as 
those motivations likely have implications for both how a mediation process might proceed and 
its prospects for success. To that end, significant attempts have been made to understand and 
explain states’ motivations as mediators (Beardsley & Greig, 2009; Melin, 2014; Melin, Gartner, 
& Bercovitch, 2013; Greig, 2005; Greig & Regan, 2008, Maoz and Terris, 2006). In each of 
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these cases, however, the arguments have conceived mediator motivations in terms of state 
interests and relationships, such as economic ties, historical ties, alliances, and conflict 
characteristics. As such, mediator motivations are often seen as one-dimensional. Where 
motivations are cast as dynamic, the dynamics are driven by structure-level factors. Domestic 
political factors are not appropriately considered, and therefore are unable to provide a complete 
explanation of the variation in mediator motivations across time, especially regarding variations 
in approach to the same, ongoing conflict. For instance, most U.S. presidents have sought to 
mediate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at some point during their administration, but there has 
been considerable variation in approach and level of commitment across administrations, even 
though Israel is considered an important U.S. ally, and that success in resolving the conflict 
would likely pay dividends for U.S. foreign policy in the region. As such, much of the mediation 
research cannot incorporate the emerging consensus in the literature that suggests that foreign 
policy decisions are made primarily with domestic ramifications is mind (Ostrom & Job, 1986; 
Putnam, 1989; Chiozza & Goemans, 2003; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 
2003). As such, domestic political conditions create both incentives for, and constraints on, the 
decision to offer and engage in mediation. This study addresses the questions of varying 
commitment and strategy in mediation by linking theories of mediator motivation to those of 
foreign policy as a two-level game—arguing that domestic political factors drive mediator 
behavior. Specifically, the offer of mediation is likely to be extended at times when there is 
sufficient legislative cover for the president to avoid criticism and to deliver upon any 
commitments offered in the negotiation process.  
Scholars employing similar arguments have traditionally drawn from diversionary 
explanations of conflict, suggesting that presidents are more likely to use military force when 
deteriorating domestic conditions necessitate presidential action (Miller, 1995; Morgan & 
Bickers, 1992). The introduction of the electoral cycle as a factor in the choice of foreign policy 
options suggests, however, that the use of force should be less likely leading up to Election Day. 
Gaubatz (1991) finds that democratic leaders are most likely to use military force early in their 
tenures, with that likelihood decreasing as elections near. The explanation for such a finding is 
that democratic societies are likely to punish leaders at the polls for pursuing policies that put 
lives at risk, even when they are considered a victory (Chiozza & Goemans, 2003). Thus, 
impending elections likely cause U.S. presidents to shy away from military conflict, regardless of 
3 
 
the need for policy success. Substituting diplomacy, however, is likely to be lower-risk. Such a 
claim is expected to be limited to democratic governments, as autocrats have incentives to 
demonstrate strength—perhaps through a show of force, as procedural elections or other 
institutionally-mandated transitions near. In addition to further explaining how domestic political 
interests lead presidents to focus a variable amount of attention and resources toward mediation, 
these findings also inform the conflict resolution literature more generally, by calling into 
question the efficacy of democratic states as peace makers.  
Leaders are also likely to consider their level of political support when choosing to offer 
mediation. The literature suggests that presidents become more aggressive in their use of foreign 
policy when they enjoy significant legislative cover—in the shape of a majority of co-partisans 
in the legislature (Howell & Pevehouse, 2007)—or when they are able to pass legislation 
efficiently (Foster & Palmer, 2006; Ragsdale, 1998). Thus, presidents with higher levels of 
support in Congress should be more confident in their ability to mediate overseas conflicts and 
should have greater access to resources to do so successfully.  
Empirical results support the notion that U.S. presidents are more likely to engage in 
mediation when they enjoy significant political cover, suggesting that such an endeavor 
constitutes a net spending of political capital. However, there is minimal support for the 
argument that presidents’ focus on mediation is influenced by the election cycle, or that the 
election cycle creates an inverse conditional relationship in the special case where an incumbent 
president is running for re-election and lacks Congressional support necessary to pass legislation. 
Such results, taken together, imply that presidents are constrained by domestic politics when 
considering mediation as a foreign policy option. Moreover, they comport with the notion of a 
“prudent public,” whereby presidents are unable to use foreign policy selectively to generate 
quick boosts in public approval or help win elections, due to voters’ understanding of the 
national interest and the political motivations of such behavior (Jentleson, 1992). Finally, the 
results illustrate that the decision to offer mediation is likely made primarily as the result of 
domestic political calculations, while less attention is being paid to the conflict conditions and 
the “ripeness” for resolutions. Such a result also helps to explain why mediation attempts are 
often unsuccessful, despite the number of resources that the U.S. can bring to bear in the 
endeavor. Without sufficient legislative support, presidents are unlikely to be able to mobilize 
their full contingent of resources, as doing so would be politically costly. Moreover, such results 
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imply that because presidential administrations focus on diplomacy when domestic conditions 
will likely minimize costs, less attention is being paid to the conflict conditions and their ripeness 
for resolution, aligning with existing scholarship (Grieg, 2005).  
While the results are limited to the United States in scope, they open the door for 
comparative inquiry and suggest that states’ domestic institutional configuration, not power, may 
be the determining factor in the ability to credibly commit to a mediation effort that will yield a 
peaceful resolution of conflict. The next sections discuss the literature supporting the rationale 
for such a study, develop two potential theoretical models for testing, explain the methodology 
and tests employed, and finally interpret the results and expound on their implications. 
States as Mediators 
Powerful states are the most common state mediators of international conflicts. The 
United States is the most common mediator, accounting for 31% of single-state mediation 
attempts from 1945-1999, while permanent members of the United Nations Security Council 
account for a total of 42.5% of single-state mediation efforts over that period (Bercovitch & 
Schneider, 2000). States appeal to belligerents as mediators, as opposed to intergovernmental 
organizations, private citizens, or other international bodies, because of the numerous resources 
that they can provide to manipulate the conflict landscape and their ability to overcome 
collective action problems. Additionally, a large number of mediation efforts are initiated by the 
mediator, rather than one or both of the belligerents (Bercovitch & Schneider, 2000; Bercovitch 
& Fretter, 2007). Such occurrences suggest that state leaders see mediation as an avenue through 
which they can benefit politically. Therefore, identifying the conditions under which leaders see 
conflict resolution as a politically useful endeavor is necessary toward understanding the 
likelihood that the conflict resolution attempt will lead to peace. It is also key to grasping the full 
dynamics of the mediation process.  
This discussion suggests that state mediators’ primary motivations are not necessarily 
resolution of the conflict, but rather some political benefit. As such, the motivations of the state 
and its political actors should be considered when assessing the likelihood that mediation will be 
offered, and if mediation attempts will be successful (Beardsley & Grieg, 2009; Touval & 
Zartman, 1985; Touval, 1992), as well as, whether the agreement reached will last (Werner and 
Yuen 2005). The question that stems from this broad analysis of state actors as mediators is: 
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what political dimension drives states to want to engage in mediation and what factors restrain 
states from doing so?   
Given that powerful states are most adept at using manipulative mediation strategies, 
taken along with research suggesting that manipulative interventions most often lead to short-
lived agreements (Beardsley, 2011), it can be argued that state actors engaging in mediation are 
primarily driven by the political benefits of such a short-term agreement. By manipulating the 
payoff structures for conflicting parties, states do little to mollify the underlying sources of 
conflict. Instead, they simply make the benefits of peace (as opposed to resolved conflict) worth 
the costs, which are somewhat reduced. Moreover, these findings suggest that leaders of 
democratic states deem the increased resources and effort needed to ensure a more durable peace 
agreement through mediation will yield little marginal political benefit at home. Because these 
leaders stay in power by appealing to a domestic audience, the primary goal of any mediation 
attempt is to impress that domestic audience, or at least key members and groups of it. Thus, an 
understanding of mediation within the dynamics of leader decision-making is necessary to fully 
explain its occurrence and process. 
Mediation as a Foreign Policy Decision 
Those who have examined mediator motivations systematically have argued that the 
decision to mediate occurs within the context of the existing foreign policy landscape, and also 
have criticized the conflict resolution program for largely ignoring such a fact (Touval, 2003; 
Touval & Zartman, 1985). However, to the extent that mediator motivations have been tested, 
examinations have been limited to structural explanations of foreign policy, focusing on alliance, 
economic, and historical ties (Kleiboer, 2002; Greig & Regan, 2008; Touval & Zartman, 1985); 
more importantly, these studies have not focused on how domestic political factors affect leader 
decision-making. Such an approach fit well within the Cold War thinking that international 
relations trumped domestic politics. States conducted foreign policy as rational unitary actors 
constantly seeking to increase their security (Waltz, 1979). This rationale explained key Cold 
War cases, such as mediation of the Falklands Crisis, where the U.S. intervened to maintain 
stability among key allies. This approach has driven how scholars have explained mediator 
motivations. However, in doing so they overlook key dynamics in the conflict resolution process. 
Specifically, these explanations have difficulty explaining why there is variation in states’ 
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willingness to engage in mediation across time (even within one conflict), and why there is 
variation in the mediation strategies that states employ.  
Another important consideration is the non-use of mediation in U.S. foreign policy. 
Conflict mediation is most often thought to be a liberal foreign policy approach, using soft power 
and influence rather than coercion to peacefully resolve conflict. Thus, the conventional wisdom 
suggests that leaders whose ideological standpoint prefers dovish foreign policy approaches are 
more likely to favor mediation as a policy option. Thus, while the U.S. presidents, as leaders of a 
powerful democratic country, are more likely to engage in mediation than autocratic leaders, 
there is also likely to be variation in the extent of mediation behavior based on party identity, 
where Democratic presidents are more likely to engage in mediation than Republican presidents. 
Such an argument stems from not only the notion that ideology is likely to drive foreign policy 
behavior, but also because of arguments suggesting that the primary domestic audience that 
leaders are courting through their foreign policy decisions are their own political supporters 
(Morgan & Bickers, 1992). However, research also suggests that while dovish leaders are likely 
to default to cooperative foreign policy measures, such measures can lack credibility due to the 
lack of sunk political costs. Thus, while mediation is likely to be offered less often by hawkish 
leaders, those that do occur are more likely to be successful because hawkish political leaders are 
putting more at stake, reputationally, by engaging in peacemaking (Schultz, 2005).  
Because there is considerable fluctuation in interest from states in resolving ongoing 
conflicts over time, a state-centric model of mediator motivation is not sufficient. For instance, 
the U.S. has at times committed large quantities of resources to resolving the ongoing conflict 
between Israelis, Palestinians, and the neighboring Arab states—including a great deal of the 
president’s political capital—while at other times, the incumbent administration focuses its 
attention elsewhere. Moreover, U.S. involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict is primarily driven 
by domestic political interests (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007). Mediation is a less popular foreign 
policy option when the U.S. is involved in conflict as a belligerent, as can be seen by the lack of 
interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict after the onset of the Iraq War in 2003, when there had been 
considerable interest in the lead up to the war. Because resources and attention are being 
occupied by the conflict in which the U.S. is directly involved and democratically-elected leaders 
are likely pay electoral consequences for failures in war, it is less likely that U.S. presidents will 
divert effort and resources to third-party mediation under such circumstances (Chiozza & 
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Goemans, 2003; Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995). Therefore, seeking to explain mediation 
occurrence (and offers) requires a more nuanced approach to foreign policy decision making: 
one that recognizes that diplomacy is chosen as one policy option out of the many that state 
leaders have at their disposal. A calculated political decision process takes place in choosing to 
focus on mediation from this range of policy options, which includes domestic and international 
endeavors and their likely ramifications. Contemporary scholarship on foreign policy has 
focused on political leaders as the key players in decision-making. Because U.S. presidents act in 
both domestic and international politics, but are ultimately held accountable by a democratic 
voting audience, foreign policy endeavors are likely to be undertaken with their domestic 
political ramifications in mind. Similarly, leaders can attempt to use foreign policy as a tool to 
improve their domestic political standing. Thus, not only do international factors constrain 
domestic politics, as neorealism contends, but domestic motivations and constraints influence the 
way that leaders behave internationally.  
Mediation and Foreign Policy Substitution: A “Record of Success” 
Historical evidence suggests that the voting public can often be rallied in favor of pro-
peace political candidates (Page & Shapiro, 1992; Brace & Hinckley, 1994). As such, 
incumbents may have incentives to use the tools of their office similarly, pursuing a 
peacemaking-focused foreign policy agenda. In 2008, Barack Obama ran for president on a 
peace-centered foreign policy platform, seeking to appeal to a war-weary public. Dwight 
Eisenhower sought the peacemaker perception toward the end of his tenure in office, as he 
engaged in talks with the Soviet Union in order to bolster the prospects of Republican candidates 
in the 1960 elections (Hughes, 1962). Similarly, Lyndon Johnson consciously sought to appear 
as a peacemaker in 1968, halting strategic bombings of Vietnam in the lead-up to elections, and 
even Richard Nixon used the power of his office to create the image of pro-peace foreign policy, 
and maintain public support, by timing troop withdrawals from Vietnam (Burbach, 2004). 
Research also suggests that political leaders can indeed boost domestic approval ratings by 
engaging in high-profile mediation efforts (Todhunter, 2013). Such occurrences are well 
explained by the concept of foreign policy substitutability (Most & Starr, 1984). However, a 
significant body of research suggests that the American public is sufficiently “prudent” in their 
responses to foreign policy endeavors, primarily the use and threat of military force, and thus can 
discern when such an effort is conducted in the national interest, and when it is simply a political 
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maneuver (Jentleson, 1992: Jentleson & Britton, 1998). Such a dichotomy implies that there may 
be incentives to actively use diplomacy to boost a president’s domestic standing, while at the 
same time an argument can be made that presidents are likely to be punished for doing so.   
The literature on leader survival suggests that democratically-elected leaders are likely to 
be punished for military failure, and as the probability that they will lose office increases, the 
likelihood that they will engage in the use of force decreases (Chiozza & Goemans, 2003). 
Unlike the use of force, mediation has less potential to be a politically expensive policy choice 
because it incurs few costs up front and does not ultimately bear many of the costs of failure. 
Mediating an overseas dispute not only lacks the potential for violent loss of life associated with 
military force, it also requires considerably less commitment of resources and political capital 
from the mediator at the outset, which in turn minimizes the risk that must be accepted in 
attempting to extract a political benefit. Mediation is also more ideologically congruent with 
democracy and thus likely to be well-received both domestically and internationally. However, it 
can also be argued that with the aim of consolidating a domestic payoff through mediation of a 
foreign conflict, some level of success is necessary, rather than just the attempt at doing so. 
Achieving such a success, especially over the long term, likely requires the commitment of 
resources and support from Congress.  
Failure to succeed in mediation may be less likely to negatively impact a president’s 
political fortunes than failure in other policy areas. Research suggests that democratic leaders 
may be punished electorally for the use of force, even if it is thought to be successful (Chiozza & 
Goemans, 2011). As a mediator, however, a president may have less to lose. Should a president 
deem that mediation of a particular conflict will not yield the previously expected political 
benefits, or if negotiations should break down, he can walk away having committed very few 
resources to the process. Ultimately, however, presidents are likely to seek out policy options 
that have a greater probability of success. Because presidential success in mediation is likely to 
depend on his ability to introduce resources to the negotiation process, support in Congress will 
likely be necessary. Moreover, support from Congress will likely diffuse the negative impact of 
failure and make the mediation effort more credible to the disputing parties.  
Theories of Congressional Support, Elections, and Mediation 
 The theoretical argument stemming from this discussion begins with the assumption that 
presidents attempt to establish a record of policy successes to better their political fortunes and 
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those of their co-partisans (Neustadt 1960; Bond & Fleisher, 1990; Richards, et al.,1993). To do 
so, presidential administrations are most likely to focus on domestic policies, with which 
domestic political audiences can closely identify, and foreign policies enabling mobilization of 
considerable resources with high likelihood of success. Thus, mediation is most likely to occur 
when the president enjoys broad Congressional support, to mobilize numerous resources and 
send a strong signal to belligerents about commitment to the endeavor. Such a proposition is 
consistent with the “party cover” conjecture, which contends that leaders are likely to make risky 
foreign policy commitments when enjoying considerable legislative support, to minimize 
criticism from opposition and to share blame for any failures that result (Howell & Pevehouse, 
2005; Kriner, 2010). At the same time, given the argument that presidents’ primary motivation 
for engaging in mediation is to engineer a policy success that improves domestic political 
standing, the lack of legislative support can be a constraint on the offer of mediation. Such an 
argument supports the notion that the offer of mediation is most often made independently of the 
conflict conditions, and it explains why, despite the resources and power involved, mediation 
efforts are unsuccessful (Grieg, 2005).  
An additional theoretical consideration in need of testing, in the U.S. case, is the level of 
independence and primacy afforded the president in the foreign policy arena. Because the 
president can act on foreign policy matters without the consent of Congress, it can be argued 
plausibly that diplomatic efforts such as diplomacy may be appealing at times when an 
opposition Congress makes the passage of legislation difficult. In fact, when the Congressional 
majority is comprised of the opposition party to the president’s, members of that party likely 
have incentives to limit cooperation with the administration and increase the fortunes of their 
own candidate in coming elections (Mayer, 2001; Howell & Pevehouse, 2005). Scholars have 
made the “policy availability” argument that vulnerable presidents seek to substitute foreign 
policy when domestic policy options are not available, and political conditions necessitate a 
policy victory (Brulé, 2006; 2008; Marshall & Prins, 2011). While it is unlikely that engaging in 
mediation would produce a rally similar to that of a use force, it could potentially be an 
appealing policy option when the administration wants to minimize risk.  
Upcoming elections create political vulnerability for presidents. As elections approach, 
presidents should want to minimize risk while maximizing policy success. Such a perspective is 
supported by the literature that suggests leaders are less likely to use military force as the 
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chances that they will be removed from office increase (Chiozza & Goemans, 2003/2011; 
Gaubatz; 1991; Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 2003). Thus, when confronted with both an opposition 
Congress and a need to engineer policy successes due to nearing elections, presidents have 
incentives to focus on foreign policy for building this desired record of success. Because 
presidents who use force as elections near are likely to be punished by voters, they generally use 
military force early in their tenures (Gaubatz, 1991). Moreover, there is evidence in the literature 
that suggests audience costs are non-linear over a president’s term, and that presidents engage in 
more hand-tying behavior closer to elections (Chiozza, 2017). Thus, in situations where domestic 
policy avenues are largely unavailable to the president, yet nearing elections create a need for 
high-profile policy successes, mediating overseas conflicts should be an attractive policy avenue 
for presidents. Because mediation is both high-profile and low-risk, relative to other available 
policy options, a high payoff for a presidential administration is likely. Therefore, the argument 
suggests, a greater number of mediations should be seen in these situations.  
Hypotheses 
The proposed argument suggests several hypotheses about the role that domestic politics 
plays in influencing mediation. The first hypothesis concerns the expected volume of mediation, 
given the president’s support in Congress. It is expected that presidents will engage in mediation 
at times when they enjoy broad support from Congress and have an established record of 
legislative success: 
Hypothesis 1: Presidential administrations are more likely to engage in more mediations 
at times they experience higher levels of legislative support from Congress.  
The notion that presidents are likely to seek out policy options that have higher 
probabilities of success supports such a proposition. Moreover, guarantees and resources offered 
in the mediation process will need Congressional backing to be realized. Additionally, 
considerable Congressional support provides the president cover from criticism and can help to 
diffuse blame, should the effort fail. A credible signal is also sent to the disputants that the 
president is committed to the endeavor, making it a more appealing proposition for them.  
Next, the influence of the election cycle on mediation is considered. Presidents need to 
build a record of policy successes so as to be re-elected and to further the political fortunes of 
their party. Foreign policy is a high-profile policy outlet in which the president has a great deal 
of autonomy. However, military options are less likely under these conditions—presidents are 
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less likely to use military force as elections approach because of increased chances of electoral 
punishment, even when such actions are deemed successful. Diplomatic endeavors, like 
mediation, may indeed be appealing policy substitutes, as they have the potential to be high-
profile, but relatively lower risk:  
Hypothesis 2: Presidential administrations are more likely to engage in more mediation 
efforts as elections near. 
A second argument, related to elections and mediation worthy of testing, focuses 
specifically on instances in which the incumbent president is running for re-election. While a 
president is likely to want to build a record of success to help co-partisans in addition to his own 
political fortunes, it can be argued the incentives to pursue high-profile policy intended to build a 
record of success should be magnified when the incumbent is standing for re-election, as lame 
duck presidents will not benefit over the long term from the domestic payoffs associated with 
mediation: 
Hypothesis 3: Presidential administrations are more likely to engage in more mediation 
efforts as elections near, and the incumbent is running for re-election. 
In addition to more separation of the intent for individual and party benefit from the 
policy endeavor, situations in which the incumbent is running for re-election likely increases the 
appeal of a mediator to the disputants. Given that the incumbent needs the policy victory to help 
get re-elected, more resources and guarantees are likely to made available, thus increasing the 
payoffs for standing down.  
 Finally, the policy availability argument suggests a that Congressional support may have 
a conditioning effect on the impact of the election cycle on a presidential administration’s 
mediation behavior. Because an opposition Congress has incentives to block domestic policy 
options leading up to an election, presidents have greater incentives to focus on foreign policy, as 
it is an area in which they enjoy greater autonomy. Further, diplomatic options should be more 
appealing, as research suggests that presidents are less likely to use military force with 
impending elections: 
Hypothesis 4: Presidential administrations are more likely to engage in more mediations 
at times they experience lower levels of legislative success, as elections near.  
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An argument can also be made that the focus on mediation should be most likely when 
the incumbent is running for re-election. Incumbents have distinct advantages over their 
challengers in building a record of success, as they have numerous political resources at their 
disposal. Therefore, in situations where Congress is unlikely to be cooperative, presidents 
running for re-election should seek out policy options where Congress has less influence.  
Hypothesis 5: Presidential administrations are more likely to engage in more mediations 
at times they experience lower levels of legislative success, as elections near and the 
incumbent is running for re-election.  
While Congressional support would still be necessary to implement many of the 
guarantees offered as the result of a mediation effort, it is plausible that given the limited options 
present, presidents would be inclined to use mediation with the goal of generating momentum for 
a policy that was publicly popular.  
These hypotheses make explicit, testable statements about the influence Congressional 
support and impending elections on the president’s propensity to initiate mediation efforts.  Like 
other policy options, the president generally should be seen engaging in mediation when robust 
Congressional support provides the administration with considerable resources and political 
capital to engineer a peaceful resolution of conflict. Under such conditions the president has 
incentives to use foreign policy to generate a record of policy success. Additionally, disputing 
parties are likely to perceive mediation offers from a president as credible due to broad 
legislative support, increasing the likelihood that the offer is accepted and mediation is 
successful. Moreover, elections likely contribute to presidents’ increased focus on mediation as 
presidents are prone to engage in more hand-tying behavior as they near, and are also likely to 
become more risk averse. A hostile Congress likely conditions the influence that elections have 
on mediation, as presidents need to generate a record of policy successes, but have limited policy 
avenues available to them. The next section describes the empirical research design for testing 
the hypotheses.  
Research Design 
To test the hypotheses, I examined the influence of election cycles and executive-
legislative relationships on U.S. mediation efforts since World War II, observing the data 
quarterly. 
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The dependent variable, Mediation, represents a count of mediation efforts initiated by 
the U.S. government in a given quarter. The source data for the measure of mediation was 
Bercovitch’s (1999) International Conflict Management (ICM) dataset, which coded the identity 
of mediators who engage in mediations with disputing parties. Each mediation attempted, or 
offered, was verified to have been conducted on behalf of the U.S. government. Cases where 
U.S. citizens mediated privately, such Jimmy Carter’s involvement in Haiti, are excluded. The 
data was observed quarterly and Mediation reflects a count of new mediation efforts during the 
quarter. Because each individual meeting was coded as a mediation attempt, an increase in 
mediation volume represents an increased focus by the administration on mediation. U.S. 
Mediations is described in Table 1. It ranges in value from 0 to 8 new mediation attempts per 
quarter. The mean is 1.398 new mediation attempts per quarter, with a standard deviation of 
1.429 and a variance of 2.041. No new mediations occurred in 60 quarters, or 29.85% of the 
time. A single new mediation attempt was undertaken in 62 quarters, or 30.85% of the time, 
while 2 new mediations occurred in 48 quarters, or 23.88% of the time, and 4 new mediation 
attempts occurred, or 8.46% of the time. There are 13 quarters in which 4 to 8 new mediation 
attempts occurred, comprising roughly 7% of the sample.  
The primary explanatory variable is a measure of the president’s legislative support in 
Congress. Presidential success corresponds to the percentage of Congressional roll call votes 
that concurred with the president’s position (Ragsdale, 1998).  This measure directly captures the 
president’s ability to pursue remedial policy using legislation, and is a more direct indicator of 
the effects of divided government on policy outputs (see e.g., Foster, 2006). Given that both 
chambers of Congress must approve the president’s proposal, a score is used that corresponds to 
the chamber in which the presidential success score is lower.  
The frequency of mediation efforts is hypothesized to be a function of the election cycle. 
Election, measures the U.S. presidential election cycle. A “1” is coded for each election year and 
the second two quarters of the preceding year. Because opposition candidates begin to emerge in 
the latter half of the year prior to presidential elections, and the electoral landscape becomes the 
most salient topic of political discourse, such a time frame is likely to see the president 
attempting to shore up public support. Moreover, the role that domestic audience costs play in 
influencing foreign policy is thought to be greater during election cycles (Chiozza, 2017). Re-
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election is coded according to the same scheme as Election, but only for quarters leading up to 
elections in which the incumbent is running for re-election.   
Because hypotheses 4 and 5 are conditional, presidential support in Congress is interacted 
with the election cycle variable to assess the effect of elections on mediation efforts conditioned 
by Congress. The marginal effects for the interaction terms should indicate a relationship 
between impending elections and an increase in the propensity for mediation during periods in 
which Congressional opposition is sufficient to block presidential domestic policy reform (Kam 
& Franzese, 2005; Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006). 
The frequency of mediation is hypothesized to be a function of Congressional support 
and the election cycle. However, because the president is trying to manipulate public opinion and 
engineer electoral success, his actions are likely to be driven by his popularity. Thus, a measure 
of presidential approval is included to capture the public’s evaluation of the president’s job 
performance. Presidential approval is measured as the quarterly average of all Gallup 
presidential job approval polls.  
In addition, controls are used to account for quarterly Uses of force. Presidents making 
the decision to deploy military forces against targets abroad are likely to have less time or 
motivation to consider peacemaking efforts. Consequently, as the number of uses of force 
increases, presidents should initiate fewer mediation efforts. Uses of force are drawn from the 
Blechman-Kaplan/Fordham list of U.S. uses of force (Fordham, 1998; Fordham & Sarver, 2002). 
In a similar fashion, a variable indicating War, which taps U.S. war involvement, is included. 
The United States’ involvement in wars is likely to reduce the pool of available resources with 
which presidents can address other crises. Thus, the analysis controls for the impact of wars by 
including a dummy variable that takes on the value of “1” for quarters in which the U.S. was 
involved in the Korean, Vietnam, and first Gulf War.   
Negative binomial regression estimates are employed to test the hypotheses. Because the 
dependent variable, U.S. Mediations, is an over-dispersed event count variable Poisson 
regression models are not appropriate, as they assume that the mean is equal to the variance. 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for U.S. Mediations. The variance, 2.041, is considerably 
larger than the mean, 1.398. Such a conclusion is supported by the alpha statistic generated with 
each of the models (see Table 2). In each case, the alpha statistic is significantly different than 
zero, suggesting that the negative binomial estimator is more appropriate (Long & Freese, 2006). 
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However, because the Poisson regression model has smaller confidence intervals than the 
negative binomial estimator, Poisson models were also run as a robustness check. The results did 
not differ in significance or substance from the negative binomial estimates.  
Results and Discussion 
Table 2 shows the negative binomial estimates for the relationships between the 
Congressional success of the president, which is thought to be a direct measure of the effects of 
divided government, the election cycle, and U.S. mediation efforts across quarters from 1949-
1995. Robust standard errors are clustered around presidential administrations. Model 1.1 
measures the effect of presidential success, independent of elections. Model 1.2 introduces the 
election variable and Model 1.3 introduces the re-election variable. Models 1.4 and 1.5 test the 
conditioning effect that presidential success exerts over the election cycle’s influence on U.S. 
mediations.  
The empirical results support the argument that presidents are likely to engage in a higher 
volume of mediation endeavors at times when they enjoy broad support in Congress. Model 1.1 
shows a positive and statistically significant relationship between presidential success in 
Congress and the number of new mediation efforts initiated. Substantively, the model suggests 
that at the mean presidential success score, with all other variables held constant (continuous 
variables at their means and dichotomous variables at zero), presidents are likely to engage in 
1.644 new mediation attempts per quarter. A one standard deviation increase from the mean in 
the presidential success score (17.715 percentage points), suggests that, on average, presidents 
will begin 1.900 new mediations per quarter. Thus, a one standard deviation increase in the 
presidential success score suggests roughly a 14% increase in mediation activity. The impact is 
similar for model 1.2, which controls for elections, suggests that a one standard deviation 
increase from the mean in presidential success is likely to yield approximately a 12% increase in 
mediation activity.  
Additionally, the positive and significant relationship between presidential success is still 
observed when the election cycle variables are introduced. However, according to models 1.2 
and 1.3, Election and Re-election, respectively, are negatively associated with the volume of new 
mediation efforts. However, no statistically significant relationship is observed. Such results 
suggest that the election cycle has no statistically significant impact on presidents’ mediation 
activity. Thus, presidents are not increasing their mediation activity in order to improve their 
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electoral prospects or those of their party. Interestingly, however, these results differ from 
research on the use of force leading up to elections, where strong negative associations are found 
(Gaubatz, 1991; Williams, 2013). These studies argued that the use of military force decreases as 
elections near, due to the fact that leaders fear electoral punishment for subjecting voters to the 
costs of conflict. These results may imply that while leaders do not seek to increase mediation 
activity in order to get produce positive results at the ballot box, the fears of punishment that are 
present with the use of military force are absent. However, mediation, like many foreign policy 
endeavors, is most likely to occur at times when the president is politically secure. Such a result 
is consistent with the notion that despite relative autonomy in foreign policy, presidents prefer 
broad party cover to minimize criticism and share blame for shortcomings, while maximizing the 
number of political and economic resources that can be committed to the effort when mediating 
(Howell & Pevehouse, 2005).  
Models 1.4 and 1.5 test conditional relationships between presidential success in 
Congress and election cycles. Thus, the hypotheses suggest that the influence that the election 
cycle has on mediation activity varies, depending on a president’s level of Congressional 
success. Model 1.4 examines the extent to which presidential success conditions the influence of 
all presidential election cycles on the frequency of mediation, while model 1.5 examines the 
extent to which presidential success conditions those election cycles where the incumbent is 
running for re-election. Because the models involve interaction terms, testing the extent to which 
one independent variable’s influence on the dependent variable is conditioned by the value of a 
second independent variable, a graphical depiction is most useful for interpretation of both 
association and levels of certainty (Kam & Franzese, 2005; Brambor, Clark & Golder, 2006). 
Thus, to properly assess statistical significance, the marginal effects of presidential success on 
the election and re-election cycles are plotted, in conjunction with upper and lower 95% 
confidence levels, across the range of the presidential success variable.  
Models 1.4 and 1.5 behave as expected, in terms of direction, but fail to demonstrate 
statistical significance at the 95% confidence level. As expected, the slope of the marginal effects 
curve is negative for both models. However, the lack of statistical significance suggests that no 
systematic conclusions can be made about the hypothesized relationship. In sum, legislatively 
weak presidents are not seen using mediation differently than those who are more successful in 
Congress during the election cycle, regardless of re-election status. Therefore, support for the 
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“policy availability” argument cannot be confirmed. The lack of an observed relationship also 
implies that presidents view diplomacy differently than the use of military force, though both fall 
under the realm of foreign policy when it comes to engineering a policy success. While it has 
been argued that presidents seek to substitute foreign policy at times when domestic policy 
avenues are unavailable or are inefficient, these results suggest that those arguments are limited 
to the use of military force. The results are consistent with the notion of a prudent public 
regarding foreign policy, which contends that the public is likely able to discern between policy 
activity that serves national interests and activities that are engineered to provide leaders with the 
appearance of success.  
Control variables used in the models behave largely as expected and yield some 
interesting insight. As expected, the dichotomous variable for war is negatively correlated with 
the frequency of U.S. mediations, and statistically significant across the models. Substantively, 
when the U.S. is engaged in war, the number of new mediations expected in a given quarter 
drops from 1.610 to 0.954, or 41% decrease in mediation activity. Thus, involvement in war 
makes it considerably less likely that presidents will engage in peacemaking endeavors, as doing 
so would likely divert resources, political and material, from the war effort. No relationship is 
observed between uses of force, short of war and mediation, however.  
In all, the empirical results in these models provide support for the argument that 
presidents are likely to engage in mediation at times when they enjoy broad support in Congress. 
Thus, mediation is most likely undertaken under similar domestic political conditions as many 
other types of foreign policy. However, the results also suggest that presidents do not use 
mediation as a policy tool to help improve their electoral fortunes or engineer a policy success, 
as has been shown to be the case with saber-rattling and the use of military force. These 
conclusions are consistent with the notion that presidents are risk averse in foreign policy and 
thus seek to conduct international affairs when they are least likely to be criticized, and most 
likely to be successful. These results also suggest that presidents are constrained in their use of 
mediation by domestic political considerations, and that mediation efforts will become less 
appealing policy options for presidents in need of policy successes to help their domestic 
political fortunes. 
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Implications of the Results 
The results observed herein suggest several important implications for the study of 
conflict resolution, as well as that of foreign policy decision-making. Broadly speaking, the 
results suggest that research on the motivations of states as third-party mediators needs to look 
beyond the state interest to incorporate domestic politics and institutional rules. Doing so also 
creates several opportunities for future research. Initially, the results presented here may appear 
to be sui generis to the U.S. case. Indeed, these arguments hinge on the constitutional separation 
of powers and the executive’s primacy in U.S. foreign policy. However, given that an 
overarching goal of the conflict resolution research program is to understand the factors that 
make peaceful conflict settlement more likely, it is important to consider the extent to which 
domestic factors drive and constrain mediation efforts. The United States is thought to be an 
appealing mediator due to its position as a superpower in the international system. It can bring 
numerous resources to bear in any mediation effort. However, given that the offer of mediation is 
likely driven and constrained by domestic political considerations, largely because of 
institutional configurations, many U.S. mediation efforts may lack sufficient credibility, leading 
to the observation that many of them are ultimately unsuccessful.  
The observation that U.S. presidents are likely to be cautious in pursuing mediation, 
doing so at times when they enjoy broad Congressional success, is increasingly important to the 
understanding of conflict resolution processes as divided government becomes the norm in the 
United States and legislative production decreases. While the United States has traditionally been 
deemed an appealing mediator due to its broad international interests, its role as a global leader, 
and its ability to commit significant tangible resources to the negotiation process, it can 
manipulate the payoffs for otherwise obstinate belligerents. Given the observation that the 
commitment of such resources is likely to hinge upon a record of legislative success in Congress, 
the trend toward divided government suggests that mediation will become less common in U.S. 
foreign policy. As such, a more complete examination of the market for mediators will be 
necessary.  
These results also suggest that comparative examination of domestic political influences 
on mediation efforts would likely bring to light institutional arrangements that lead to more 
credible mediation efforts by states. For, instance parliamentary democracies, in which the 
executive and legislative functions are linked, likely make more credible offers of mediation. 
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Because the government risks a vote of no confidence due to policy failure, mediation offers, as 
well as other risky foreign policy endeavors, are likely to be less common. However, those that 
are made are more likely to be credible, with significant political and economic resources 
committed by the government to ensure a policy success. Because parliamentary governments 
lack the level of separation between the executive and legislative branches, they are more likely 
to be legislatively productive. Thus, they will likely engage in foreign policy with greater 
credibility and will be able to signal a greater commitment to the effort. Greater commitment 
from a less powerful mediator may yield more durable conflict resolution results. Such a 
proposition has not yet been tested empirically.  
Similarly, conflict resolution research would benefit from more systematic, cross-national 
analysis of the resources and skills that certain states can utilize in building peace. Several 
studies argue that individual states are better-suited to engage in mediation, regardless of 
international power considerations, because of national character, the nature of domestic civil 
society, and both the political and private social infrastructure that exist (see e.g., Moolakkattu, 
2005). Systematic examinations of such factors would work to enrich theories of state 
motivations and conflict resolution. 
There are also several opportunities for further inquiry in the research on foreign policy 
decision-making. While domestic political considerations and institutional relationships clearly 
impact the appeal of diplomacy as a vehicle to build a record of political success, the use of 
mediation as an isolated dependent variable may be in appropriate. Pooling all forms of 
diplomacy (see e.g., Melin, 2014), or studying diplomacy and the use of military force together, 
are likely to yield interesting and useful insights that might explain presidential behavior more 
completely. As it is well established that dovish leaders are more likely to offer mediation, but 
hawkish leaders are more likely to be successful mediators, a broader examination of mediation 
with more precise and leader-focused data is appropriate. 
The results presented here are also consistent with the notion that the U.S. public is 
prudent when it comes to assessing the value of foreign policy efforts to the national interest 
(Jentleson, 1992). While the political use of military force has been shown to lead to short-lived 
spikes in presidential approval, commanding an extensive literature on diversionary conflict, this 
study suggests that the logic of diversionary efforts does not extend to the strategic use of third-
party mediation.  
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Conclusion 
 The notion that leaders seek to use foreign policy to improve their standing with the 
public, and thus their electoral fortunes, is relatively uncontroversial among scholars. This study 
set out to test the applicability theories explaining foreign policy actions as tools for domestic 
gain, to third-party mediation.  The role that diplomacy plays in such a dynamic, and the role that 
domestic political conditions play in shaping presidential incentives, has not been considered. 
Given that there is considerable variation in the focus on mediation across presidential 
administrations, while the same opportunities are present in the form of ongoing conflicts, 
examining domestic politics as the source of such variation is appropriate. The results presented 
here suggest domestic political factors play a key role in determining when mediation is chosen 
as a policy option. However, these results suggest that rather than creating incentives for 
mediation, domestic politics serves as a constraint. Presidents are seen focusing on mediation at 
times when they enjoy broad support in Congress and thus are likely to experience minimal 
criticism of their endeavor, and can count on the availability of resources to manipulate the 
landscape of negotiations. Moreover, taken with contemporary trends in U.S. politics, the 
findings suggest that mediation will become less common in U.S. foreign policy.  Because they 
U.S. has traditionally been an appealing mediator to belligerents, greater cross-national 
understanding of the supply-side factors that contribute to successful mediation is warranted. 
Including the dynamics of a mediator’s domestic political situation in models of conflict 
resolution processes should contribute to a better understanding of the factors that lead to 
peaceful settlement of disputes and thus should become more common in mainstream conflict 
resolution studies.  
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Appendices 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for U.S. Mediations  
 
N = 201  
 
Mean = 1.398 
 
Standard Deviation = 1.429 
 
Variance = 2.041 
New US Mediations (per 
quarter) 
Frequency Percent 
0 60 29.85 
1 62 30.85 
2 48 23.88 
3 17 8.46 
4  6 2.99 
5  4  1.99 
6  1 0.50 
7  2 1.00 
8  1  0.50 
Total 201 100.00 
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Table 2: Effect of Legislative Support on U.S. Mediation (Quarterly Data, Negative 
Binomial Estimates with robust standard errors clustered on presidential 
administration) 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3 Model 1.4 Model 1.5 
Presidential 
Success 
 
0.008 
(0.003)*** 
 
0.007 
(0.003)** 
0.008 
(0.003)** 
0.013 
(0.006)** 
0.012 
(0.005)** 
Election ___ 
 
-0.172 
(0.152) 
___ 1.051 
(0.814) 
___ 
Re-election ___ 
 
___ -0.090 
(0.129) 
___ 1.153 
(1.030) 
Election x 
Presidential 
success 
___ 
 
___ ___ -0.021 
(0.014) 
___ 
Re-election x 
Presidential 
success 
___ ___ ___ ___ -0.021 
(0.017) 
GDP Growth -0.011 
(0.012) 
-0.009 
(0.012) 
-0.011 
(0.012) 
-0.015 
(0.011) 
-0.015 
(0.011) 
Approval -0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
 
War 
 
-0.529 
(0.167)*** 
 
-0.521 
(0.162)*** 
-0.532 
(0.160)*** 
-0.485 
(0.150)*** 
-0.543 
(0.167)*** 
Uses of Force -0.025 
(0.032) 
 
-0.023 
(0.035) 
-0.023 
(0.033) 
-0.008 
(0.034) 
-0.011 
(0.038) 
Constant 
 
 
0.694 
(0.595) 
0.827 
(0.657) 
0.741 
(0.606) 
0.409 
(0.559) 
0.392 
(0.475) 
Alpha 0.172 
(0.102)** 
 
0.166 
(0.106)** 
0.170 
(0.104)** 
0.132 
(0.067)** 
0.137 
(0.060)** 
N 
 
172 172 172 172 172 
Note: Dependent variable is quarterly US mediation attempts. Robust standard errors, clustered 
on presidential administration, in parentheses, ***p<.01, **p<.05, *.10, two-tailed tests. 
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Figure 2: The Effect of Re-election Cycle, Conditioned by 
Presidential Success, on US Mediations (Quarterly Data) 
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Figure 1: The Effect of Election Cycle, Conditioned by 
Presidential Success, on US Mediations (Quarterly Data) 
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